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ToRTs-THE DuTY To REscuE-"AM I MY BROTHER's KEEPER?"-A recent case, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana,1 and

commented upon elsewhere in this issue,2 involved the interesting
question as to the existence of a duty to go to the aid of a person who
is in helpless peril through no initial tault on the part of the defendant.

1
2

L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, (Ind. 1942) 40 N. E. (2d) 334.
Infra, p. 564.
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COMMENTS

A six-year-old youngster, who was accompanying his mother on
a shopping tour, fell while descending on an escalator in defendant's
department store. Fingers on both of his hands were caught in moving
parts of the mechanical stairway. Although it was clear that the original injury was not caused by defendant's negligence, there was delay
in stopping the escalator, and the injuries were aggravated as a result
of the prolonged operation of the device. The question before the
court, then, was most specific: Was there a duty, on the part of the
originally innocent defendant, to go to the assistance of the helpless
child? The question was answered in the affirmative; the Indiana court
found such a relationship, in the case before it, as would justify the imposition of the affirmative duty to aid. The case contained some unusual features-features which were not present in some of the earlier
cases in this field. For that reason, if for no other, it may be used as a
stepping stone to a brief discussion of the general problem of which it
is illustrative.
In an address delivered on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Cincinnati Law School, over thirty-five years ago, Dean
Ames deplored the fact that "The law does not compel active benevolence between man and man." He suggested, as a possible "working

rule"
" ... One who fails to interfere to save another from impending death or great bodily harm, when, he might do so with little or
no inconvenience to himself, and the death or great bodily harm
follows as a consequence of his inaction, shall be punished criminally and shall make compensation to the party injured or to his
widow and children in case of death." 3
One may safely assume that Professor Ames would have objected
to the adoption of section 3r4 of the Torts Restatement, wherein it is
said that
"The actor's realization that action on his part is necessary for
another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him the
duty to take such action."

If he was justified in labelling the early law as "unmoral," how
would he characterize a legal system which permits its Restaters to say
that
"A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front
of an approaching automobile. A could prevent B from so doing
by a word or touch without delaying his own progress. A does not
s Ames, "Law and Morals," 22 HARV. L. REv. 97 at I I 2, I I 3 ( 1908) (italics
added). Another article of this same period calling for greater recognition of moral
duty in the law of torts is Bohlen, "The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of
Tort Liability," 56 UNiv. PA, L. REv. 217, 317 (1908).
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do so, and B is run over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent
~ from stepping into the street and is not liable to B"? 4
Would he not shudder at the suggestion that
"A, a strong swimmer, sees B, against whom he entertains an
unreasonable hatred, :floundering in deep water obviously unable
to swim. Not knowing B's identity, he takes off his shoes preparatory to plunging in to his aid. Discovering B's identity, he turns
away. A is not liable to B"? 5
There seems to be no reason to doubt the validity of the Restatement's exposition; apparently, in 1942 as in 1908, it may still be said
that "It is left to one's conscience whether he shall be the Good Samaritan or not." 6 But, if we read the signs correctly, Professor Ames'
labor was not entirely in vain. In fact, the Indiana case to which we
have referred, and which we have agreed to use as an approach to the
general problem, was anticipated, albeit hopelessly, in Dean Ames'
address. Among the hypothetical cases put by the author of "Law and
Morals" was one which involved the following facts: The eye of a man
was penetrated by the glancing shot from the gun of a careful pheasant
hunter. Stunned by the shot, th.e injured man fell, face downward, into
a shallow_pool by which he was standing. The hunter might easily have
saved him, but he let him drown.7 Professor Ames, although able to distinguish the case from his other hypothetical cases ("in that the hunter,
· although he acted innocently, did bring about the dangerous situation"), could not, in 1908, predict success for the widow of the
drowned person in an action against the heartless hunter. "Here, too,
the lawyer who should try to charge the hunter would lead a forlorn
hope." 8 Need we be so pessimistic today?
One need not labor the point that a person may get into· a perilous
situation as a result of his own negligence, or as a result of defendant's
negligence, or as a result of some third party's fault, or as a consequence of some combination of those factors, or despite the fact that
no one was at fault. If the fault basis is employed, exclusively, the
answers to the cases involving the fact situations suggested are clear.
If we admit the premise that the transition as to the basis of _tort liability has changed the earlier question, "Did the defendant do the physical act which damaged the plaintiff?" to "Was the act blameworthy?" 9 we may be most dubious as to the liability of an initially
2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 314, and comment b, illustration I (1934).
Id., comment c, illustration 4.
6 Ames, "Law and Morals," 22 HARV. L. REv. 97 at 112 (1908).
7 Id. at 112.
s Id. at 113.
9 Id at 99. More accurately, perhaps, the second question has qualified the earlier
question by the addition of the fault requirement.
4
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blameless defendant who merely fails to act. But is it so clear that the
quality of defendant's conduct is always the determining factor? Dean
Ames noted certain exceptions, based, he said, on "public policy." 10
Today we could add, to the exceptions he had in mind, other cases of
liability which indicate a willingness, on the part of our courts, to place
liability on a defendant who has been guilty of no real fault. 11 Some of
these exceptional cases may, quite properly, be based upon "public
policy"; one may argue that, in one possible interpretation of that
phrase, all legal principles are based upon public policy. But some of
the situations involving liability without fault are certainly based upon
something more personal: the tremendous risk involved in the
defendant's activity,12 if, though carefully done, something "goes
• wrong''; or the utter helplessness of the plaintiff.13 It is quite natural
that, in this rescue field, the second alternative suggests itself as a matter of prime importance. Cases involving drowning sailors 14 or injured
employees 15 emphasize this feature; what more natural an "extension"
of this idea than to apply it in the case of a person who has been struck,
for example, by defendant's carefully-operated train, or his properlydriven automobile? 16 To rely on a layman's impression as to what the
"law ought to be" is dat:igerous in any case, but it is an argument with
which even great judges have toyed in some cases. And it may be
demonstrated, I think, that the ordinary man, if the question were put
to him, would suppose that although he might not have to be a Good
Samaritan ( might not have to aid the plaintiff if some third party had
caused the perilous situation), he would be in an entirely different
position if his car, for example, had struck the plaintiff and created the
perilous situation. The Indiana case seems to be the first nonrailroad
case in which the defendant's ownership and control of the dangerAmes, "Law and Morals," 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 at 100, 109 (1908).
Consider, for example, Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d)
409, 15 P. (2d) IIl8 (1932); Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328,
270 P. 952 (1928); Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1931)
54 F. (2d) 510.
12 This is the real justification apparently for the imposition of liability in the
Green and Exner cases cited supra, note I I.
13 This attribute is emphasized in the "last clear chance" cases, and though the
rescue cases are of a different sort, it is interesting to note that the Indiana Supreme
Court, in the Hicks case, suggests that "The measure of that duty is not unlike that
imposed-by the rule of the last clear chance or doctrine of discovered peril." L. S.
Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, (Ind. 1942) 40 N. E. (2d) 334 at 338.
14 See, for example, Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) 50 F.
(2d) 866, commented upon in 30 MICH. L. REV. 479 (1931).
15 Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 S. W. 43 (1914).
16 The now familiar "hit-run" statutes often contain legislative sanction for the
imposition of the rescue duty, though the primary purpose of the statute may be an
entirely different one.
10
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creating agency is emphasized. And even in that case there is a little
cloudiness, for the court states that the affirmative duty to rescue is
imposed if defendant is "a master, or an invitor," or when the dangerous agency is under defendant's control; and the court specifically
found that the plaintiff was an invitee. ·we are left to speculate as to
what the court will do if the next case involves a licensee-plaintiff, or
a trespassing plaintiff. However, some gain is better than none; the
Indiana case was free from the possible argument that it was really a
case of negligent action, ra~er than inaction; and the court did state,
as a possible 1,)asis for the imposition of the duty to aid, "management
and control of the instrumentality" which was causing the aggravated
injuries. What has been, in the main, up to this time, law review and
classroom argument, now has at least some measure of judicial
sanction.

P.A. L.

